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Abstract 
The ǯ dilemma suggests that a trade-off exists between, on the one hand, labour and 
welfare rights underpinned by solidarity and shared identity and, on the other hand, open 
immigration regimes. With reference to debates on free movement in the UK, it is argued: (1) that a 
progressive European critical political economy literature of the Left has a tendency to accept this 
dilemma and resolve it in favour of a the former; (2) that it does so because it erroneously conflates 
the free movement of people with the (increasingly neoliberal) free movement of goods, capital and 
services; and (3) that it could and should treat human mobility as qualitatively different and, 
consequently, need not accept the terms of the ǯ dilemma. The argument has important 
implications for a progressive politics in general and for the ǯ (particularly the Labour ǯȌ 
position in the UK on free movement (and, by extension, on Brexit).   
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Introduction 
 
While in government the UK Labour Party enthusiastically supported the free movement regime.  
But long before the Brexit referendum in 2016 many in the party had become critical of ǯ 
decision to open UK labour markets to new member ǯ citizens following the 2004 Ǯ-ǯ 
enlargement (Watt and Wintour, 24 March 2015). The numbers of people that came to the UK from 
Eastern Europe exceeded estimates (Dustmann et al., 2003)ii and many in the party have come to 
regard the decision as a spectacular Ǯ ǯǣ a defining moment in its electoral decline and in 
the drift towards Brexit. According to this perspective, the 2004 Ǯǯ paved the way for a fused 
anti-immigration and anti-EU discourse that became increasingly prevalent following the economic 
downturn in 2007 and reached fever-pitch following the ending of transitional arrangements with 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2013. Despite efforts on the part of the Conservative-Liberal-Democrat 
coalition government to reform the rules associated with the right of EU citizens to claim benefits 
(Cameron, 26 November 2013) and ǯ partially successful efforts to elicit concessions on 
free movement from other member states in the context of membership renegotiations, the issue 
remained live Ȃ and for many was the central issue (Duncan, 15 June 2016; Ipsos MORI, April 2016) Ȃ during the referendum campaign. The Leave ǯ core and highly effective trope Ȃ the need 
to Ǯ back ǯ Ȃ was for many voters perceived as most real and urgent in relation to the 
question of free movement. Post-referendum, the prioritisation of this issue meant that continued 
single market membership Ȃ which would require the maintenance of the status-quo on free 
movement Ȃ was ruled out by the May government (May, 2017: 4).  
 
Accepting the contours of this narrative, Ed ǯ former pollster has suggested that, ǲȏȐ 
is a growing cultural gap between the way [traditional Labour] voters see the world and the 
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cosmopolitanism and utopian egalitarianism of much of the Labour ǥ These voters believe 
that a ǯ first priority should be its citizens. They see no reason why citizens of other 
countries should have entitlements in the UK simply because they move ǥ They think Labour 
cannot comprehend these positions, let alone agree with ǳ (Morris, 2015). Apparently 
endorsing such concerns, many pro-Europeans and many formerly staunch defenders of free 
movement in the parliamentary party seemed to drift away from those ostensibly Ǯutopian 
cosmopolitanǯ positions at the end of 2016 (Bailey, 2016; Bush, 17 November 2016). 
 
At the heart of this UK-centric debate in the Labour party sits a broader dilemma Ȃ the so-called Ǯǯ ǯ Ȃ that has been picked up and considered in a number of different ways 
across a range of sub-disciplines in the political and social sciences. The dilemma suggests a tension 
or trade-off between two aspects of contemporary political and social reality that progressives 
would be likely to endorse. On the one hand, labour and welfare rights underpinned by trust, 
solidarity and shared identity and, on the other hand, permissive or open immigration regimes and 
high levels of diversity (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2013, Putnam, 2007). Among the first 
to assert the empirical reality of such a dilemma nearly three decades ago, Freeman (1986:51) 
suggested that, ǲmigration has contributed to the Americanisation of European welfare Ǥǳ To 
the extent that this verdict is accepted as correct, it is perhaps unsurprising that many on the Left 
are at least circumspect when it comes to permissive migration regimes in general and the reality 
of freedom of movement in the EU in particular. They may be uncomfortable when suggesting the 
need for closure but this is instrumental to their pursuit of substantive social and welfare 
settlements. This tendency is present in some liberal nationalist political theory (Miller, 1995, 
2016; Walzer, 1983) and echoed in some (neo)-republican EU studies work on post-national 
citizenship and free movement (Bellamy, 2008; Menéndez, 2009). According to political sociologist 
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Adrian Favell (2014a), such circumspection is also, at least implicitly, present in a body of European 
political economy literature of the Left Ȃ hereafter called Ǯ political ǯ (CPE). He 
criticises its particular conception of the way in which neoliberal market forces should be governed 
and constrained for implying a nationalist closure that cannot comfortably co-exist with the so-
called Ǯ ǯǤ This nationalism or closure is in tension with a pro-migrant cosmopolitan 
position that many progressives, including Favell, would endorse: hence, the ǯ 
dilemma.  
 
The remainder of the paper takes 	ǯs critique of CPE as its starting point to reflect upon the 
reality of the ǯ dilemma in the particular context of EU free movement. First, it argues 
that Favell is correct to highlight the CPE tendency towards closure to human mobility and hostility 
to the Ǯ ǯǡ though this is only a potential tendency that is only occasionally made 
explicit in such a literature. Second, it suggests that in opting for an alternative resolution to the ǯ dilemma based on a less critical understanding of neoliberalism, Favell is 
insufficiently sympathetic to the CPE critique of neoliberalism in Europe. Third, it makes the ǯ core argument that progressives Ȃ including Critical Political Economists  Ȃ do not need to 
accept the terms of the dilemma, at least not in relation to the ǯ Ǯ ǯǤ In passing 
through the horns of the dilemma, not only is a progressive critique of marketization 
commensurable with support for that fourth freedom, it may be regarded as that which renders it 
politically sustainable in the long-term. The paper draws on the UK case to animate and clarify the 
argument and reflects on its implications for the Left in the UK in the context of Brexit debates.  
 
Its contributions are threefold. First, it offers an empirically grounded analysis of the ǯ 
dilemma, of interest to the broad range of sub-disciplines that have engaged with this phenomenon, 
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particularly by drawing CPE into the debate. Second, it speaks to the CPE literature, reiterating 
Favellǯ call for it to reflect on its potentially exclusionary ontology and associated politics.  Contra 
Favell, it suggests this reflection does not necessarily draw CPE towards a neoliberal 
cosmopolitanism. Third, the implications of this argument are of direct relevance to UK policy 
debates and Brexit negotiations pertaining to free movement, particularly for the political Left.  
 
Critical political economy and free movement 
 
In an impassioned critique of what he variously calls a social democratic, Keynesian or Ǯǯ 
political economy literature on the EU Ȃ essentially a European CPE of the political Left  Ȃ Adrian 
Favell has suggested that it is predisposed to a problematic methodological nationalism and 
political closure which is hostile to human mobility and the freedom of movement of people across 
borders. He has described scholars working in this tradition as ǲ cosmopolitan, but 
viscerally nationalist in their conception of how markets are to be controlled or ǳ 
(2014a:284) and suggested that, ǲȏȐ of alternative political economies for Europe Ȃ re-
imposing strong, top-down, state-governed controls on the factors of production and consumption, 
and labour market restrictions and protections Ȃ should own up clearly to the anti-European 
nationalist implications of their ǳ (2014a:287) 
 
Many working in the tradition that Favell identifies for critique would not recognize the charge. 
After all, the CPE literature tends to be interested primarily in diagnosis rather than prescription. In 
the broad context of ǯ political economy, the short version of this diagnosis is an 
increasingly neoliberal and financialised capitalist settlement with all that it entails for the current 
status and future prospect of a more social Europe. In the more specific context of questions of 
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mobility and migration in Europe, CPE Ȃ broadly defined Ȃ has concerned itself, in particular, with, 
on the one hand, the ways in which this neoliberal settlement has impacted government policy 
(Menz, 2013) and, on the other, the ways in which it has affected migrant and non-migrant subjects, 
particularly in a context of increasingly flexible labour markets (Dwyer et al., 2011; Maroukis, 
2015). To the extent that prescription can be found within CPE, there is of course a long history of 
radical internationalism on the Left, encapsulated in Marx and ǯ slogan Ǯ of the world ǯǤ This argument also takes social-democratic form in cosmopolitan prescriptions for the 
uploading of a social constitutional settlement to the EU or beyond (Habermas, 2001a, 2001b). Such 
perspectives would clearly reject the idea that CPE is pathologically predisposed to a nationalism 
that is hostile to human mobility; it offers a practical as well as Ǯǯ cosmopolitanism.  
 
However, in line with 	ǯ critique, it is certainly the case that there is a strand of more 
pragmatically minded CPE that does, at least implicitly, betray a preference for the nation-state as 
the site of government for the control of the market. It is Ȃ like the Labour pollster quoted in 
introduction Ȃ critical of a Ǯǯ Leftist internationalism on the basis of the Ǯ-ǯ thesis; 
the idea that a social settlement cannot be achieved at the European or any other level above the 
nation-state because the solidarity and trust that might underpin such a settlement does not 
currently exist in such contexts (Streeck, 2014b). Rooted in a pragmatic conception of the art-of-
the-possible, this literature is primarily concerned with the ways in which the EU and its 
antecedents has Ȃ via the making of markets and the introduction of a single currency and its rules 
based governance Ȃ undermined social settlements and democracy at the national level. Fritz 
Scharpf (2015, 2002, 2009), for instance, has argued that Ǯ ǯ undermines the Ǯ ǯ of national government (2009:188). In other words, the EU has 
compromised the ability of member state governments, parliaments and, indirectly, national 
 7 
populations to affect many kinds of substantive political change in line with a republican ideal. At 
the same time, this Ǯ-ǯ orientation has eroded at least some of the national level social 
rights that are seen by many in this tradition as a ǲ of (or normative corollary for) mass ǳ (Wincott, 2006: 750-1). The Eurozone crisis has increased the pertinence of such 
critique. Even around the time of the Maastricht treaty, neo-Gramscian scholar Stephen Gill (1998) 
understood monetary union in terms of the pursuit of his notion of a Ǯ ǯ 
initiative, ǲ to lessen short-run political pressures on the formulation of [domestic] 
economic policy by implicitly redefining the boundaries of the Ǯǯ and the ǮǯǳǤ The 
response to the crisis has involved for the most part the introduction of much tougher rules of 
constitutional enforcement, justified via the deployment of an emergency discourse of existential 
crisis (White, 2015); indeed, it has been claimed that 
ǯ new constitutionalism is today better 
conceived as an Ǯ ǯ (Oberndorfer, 2015). While different perspectives 
on the political Left and within this academic literature proffer different possible routes out of 
these crises Ȃ none of them easily realizable Ȃ a growing number are suggesting that an orderly 
disintegration of the single currency should be contemplated given the intractable political 
obstacles to deeper fiscal (and political) integration Ȃ not least the aforementioned Ǯ ǯ 
argument Ȃ and the socially, economically and politically deleterious effects of a prevailing 
monetary union reliant on competitive internal devaluations (Streeck, 2014a, 2014b).  
 
According to Favell CPE ǲ support informal economic activities which seek to avoid the 
taxation and regulation that pay for communitarian re-distribution and labour protection. The Ǯǯ upshot has to be that states should control and regulate ǳ (2014: 277). This 
assertion certainly appears to be consistent with ǯ Ǯ ǯǡ which would 
seem to entail the delimiting or bordering of a demos or political community such that it can 
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democratically determine its own (socially cohesive) fate. This community would legitimate the 
regulation and control of various mobilities across national borders, including in the EU context the 
ostensibly indivisible four freedoms of goods, capital, services and people. CPE has explicitly 
critiqued the first three of these freedoms and, if not explicitly then by inference, suggested a need 
to control them. With respect to goods it has, for instance, been critical of the ways in which the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and then the single market project came to regard not only private 
actors but also national rules as potential impediments to their free movement (Joerges, 2005; 
Scharpf, 1996, 2015). With respect to services, it has been critical of attempts to promote the 
freedom of establishment of service providers in ways that would de facto undermine domestic 
corporate regulation, corporate taxation policies, labour law and collective bargaining (Genschel et 
al., 2011; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012:443). With respect to capital, this literature has been critical of 
the pursuit of a one-size-fits-all Ȃ for the most part Ǯ-ǯ or neoliberal Ȃ model in relation 
to corporate governance and capital markets, which favours finance and potentially undermines 
certain varieties of capitalism, particularly those that are more inclined to protect labour interests 
(Clift, 2009; Mügge, 2010). 
 
As regards the mobility of people Ȃ the core concern here Ȃ CPE has, in general, been less explicit in 
its critique of this Ǯǯ freedom. However, the potential for such mobility to adversely impact 
upon Ǯ ǯ Ȃ in other words, the possibility of a delimited demos to control its own 
affairs Ȃ is regarded by some as pertinent to this mobility. Höpner and Schäfer (2012) are among 
the few working within CPE to express something approximating this view explicitly. Drawing on 
the terminology of legal scholar Agustín Menéndez (2009) they suggest that there is a risk that the 
free movement of persons and an associated right of non-discrimination Ȃ including with respect to 
accessing public services and welfare Ȃ makes the EU Ǯ ǯ but also at least contributes to 
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making it Ǯ ǯǤ For them the obligation that the principle of non-discrimination places on 
member states to grant social rights may have systemic effects, putting pressure on governments to 
retrench welfare. As they put it, ǲȏȐ the reciprocity between rights and duties puts both 
the effectiveness and the legitimacy of national social policy under ǳ (Höpner and Schäfer, 
2012:447-8). Its effectiveness is potentially put under fiscal strain and its legitimacy might be 
questioned by citizens who reject the entitlements of non-citizens. We see then a communitarian 
tendency from some working in the CPE tradition to accept the terms of the aforementioned Ǯǯ ǯ and seek to resolve it in favour of closed social settlements. 
 
One way around this issue could be to permit free movement but also some discrimination of 
migrants. Ruhs (2013) has shown empirically that the progressive dilemma exists in practice 
globally; that Ǯ price of ǯ Ȃ particularly free and equal access to labour markets and social 
and economic rights for migrants Ȃ is greater closure of both state territories and labour markets. 
He cautiously endorses limiting rights to certain migrant groups (in a well-regulated way that 
outlaws exploitative practices). He suggests that, in our non-ideal world, migrants who value entry 
and work above all else prefer this system. CPE may indeed endorse some forms of discrimination 
in the context of EU free movement, particularly in terms of restricting access to certain public and 
welfare services.iii Discrimination with respect to labour market regulation and rights is, however, 
far more problematic from this perspective. Unlike Ruhs, CPE literature is not primarily concerned 
with a utilitarian weighing up the pros and cons of this reality for migrants. It is interested 
primarily in the impact of such a regime on citizens. It would be concerned that discriminatory 
labour regulations could create social dumping, wage competition and contraction. Consider, for 
instance, the fairly widespread CPE critique of the ǯ Laval judgement Ȃ and subsequent 
restrictive trade union reforms in Sweden Ȃ which effectively endorsed a degree of labour market 
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discrimination between national and non-national workers and opened the way for social dumping 
in the Swedish labour market (Davies, 2008; Höpner and Schäfer, 2012; Lindstrom, 2010).iv  
 
In the recent context of crises of mobility Ȃ a refugee crisis and a free-movement dominated Brexit 
debate Ȃ some scholars working within the CPE tradition have made more explicit their adherence 
to the logic of the ǯ dilemma and their commensurate choices with respect to human 
mobility. Wolfgang Streeck (2016b, 2016c) is among them. Focusing on the structural 
consequences of human mobility, he regards ǯ initially permissive policy towards Syrian 
refugees as an immigration policy by the back door designed to sustain a low-wage economy in 
Germany and the decision of Blair in 2004 was, for him, about, ǲȏȐ British workers, in 
particular at the lower end of the wage scale, to become more Ǯǯǳ (2016a:1). From this 
perspective, he considers legitimate the emphasis on immigration in the context of the Brexit 
referendum campaign: 
 
Looking across the Channel at the Continent, British voters may rightly have been afraid of 
being burdened with yet another quasi-constitutional, democratically unchangeable 
obligation unconditionally to open their borders and their labour markets, not just to 
immigrants from other, less prosperous EU member countries but also to whoever would 
demand entry as an asylum seeker or refugee (Streeck, 2016b:5) 
 
Seeking to understand the logic of the Brexit vote, Helen Thompson has similarly suggested a 
dynamic whereby the Eurozone crisis, ǲ Britain into an employer of last of resort for the 
economically dysfunctional and politically rotten currency ǥ  As migration to Britain from the 
periphery of the euro zone increased from 2012 so ǯ political fortunes ǳ (Thompson, 
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2016:2; see also 2017). Neither scholar, it should be said, is primarily concerned with free 
movement of people. Their broader insights are invaluable in terms of understanding the outcome 
of the referendum or the current conjuncture in ǯ political economy more generally. But to 
the extent that free movement is invoked, they reveal a readiness to accept the logic of the ǯ dilemma without recourse to concrete evidence; migration will obviously impact 
adversely on national labour markets and this will lead inexorably to politicization of the issue. 
Perhaps pushed by events, these discourses on Brexit and the refugee crisis come close to explicitly Ǯ ǯ to 	ǯ charge that a European CPE literature supports a nationalism that Ȃ from 
another, more cosmopolitan, progressive perspective Ȃ has problematic political implications for 
human mobility. Accepting the need for a choice between the Ǯǯ and the Ǯǯǡ these authors Ȃ along with growing ranks in the post referendum Labour party Ȃ privilege the latter.  
 
An alternative resolution of the ǯ dilemma 
 
In contrast to the CPE literature that he critiques, for Favell, ǲthe progressive novelty of the ǥ lies ǥ in its promise of an unbounded cosmopolitan and post-national politics and society... Less not more 
state has been the ǯ greatest achievement: bringing liberalism and individualism as an antidote 
to the deeply ingrained fascist impulses of European governments and (especially) ǳ 
(2014a:285). He presents the market as a condition of possibility for the promotion of these 
preferences and, while certainly not an apologist for neoliberalism, he is critical of those Critical 
Political Economists who fail to disaggregate its various aspects and effects through the use of the 
term neoliberalism. He is not alone in acknowledging the constitutive importance of the expansion 
and creation of a European common market and the possibility of the post-national or post-
Westphalian order in Europe, which is central to European integrationǯ defining narrative (see 
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also, Parker and Rosamond, 2013). From this perspective, market-making processes place 
important and positive limits on states and underpin individual liberties in the face of state 
oppression and violence. Such a view accords with a post-war German Ǯǯ or Ǯǯ liberalism that 
was explicitly normative in its attempt to Ǯǯ the relationship between the market and the 
state, placing the latter under the supervision of the former (Foucault, 2001). Such ideas fed into 
certain conceptions of European integration and find expression in a contemporary defence of the 
EU as non-majoritarian regulatory state (Majone, 1996; for an important CPE critique, see Wincott, 
2006).  
 
From 	ǯ particular cosmopolitan perspective, critique of the tendency towards closure 
inherent in nationalist CPE is not surprising. In relation to the Ǯ ǯǡ a combination of 
flexible labour markets and open borders have facilitated human mobility, which has, from his 
perspective, had marked economic and social benefits. Such mobility may, for Favell, hold out a 
variety of benefits and emancipatory potential. As he has said, 
 
A more, rather than less, open international labour market may, under certain conditions, 
bring more benefits to all Ȃ the migrant, the receiving state and even the sending state: in 
terms of social mobility and the circulation of human capital, skills and education; the 
complementary filling of sectoral demand (in the case of jobs not taken by native workers) 
and/or the entrepreneurial creation of new employment niches by business-minded 
migrant workers; and (in some cases) the circulation of capital back to the sending state 
(through remittances, return investment) (Favell, 2014a:278) 
 
 13 
Elsewhere Favell (2008a) has explored the potential benefits for intra-EU movers in his research on 
the lived experiences of EU-15 movers. With respect to the UK, the decision to open borders in 
2004, far from a mistake, is interpreted as a positive move that had significant benefits for the UK in 
terms of driving economic dynamism Ȃ employers attracted Ǯ young, mobile, skillful 
and ǯ migrants from new member states Ȃ as well as societal and cultural benefits 
(Favell, 2014b). This was certainly the way in which the New Labour government portrayed the 
move at the time. 
 
From a CPE perspective, of course, 	ǯ cosmopolitan position in general and his celebration of 
human mobility in particular is highly problematic given its deference to flexible labour markets. It 
is unsurprising in this respect that, as noted above, Streeck is as withering in his critique of a Ǯ moral ǯ as Favell is of the nationalism he perceives in the CPE literature. ǯ analysis of migrant and female (2016a: 216-220) inclusion in labour markets reduces 
identity politics to its role in serving ǯ particular contingent ends. The cultural politics of 
very real importance to many (Fraser, 2001) is ignored (or reduced to an overly generalised Ǯ ǯȌ in this analysis.  
 
More specifically, while Favell emphasizes the way in which human mobility can be positive for 
movers, receiving states and sending states, this is just one side of the story. For CPE, it is not the 
most significant side. First, the migrant may not be a wholly willing mover, but forced by economic 
(or political) necessity. Focusing on EU migrants, evidence suggests that many in recent significant 
waves Ȃ east-west and, more recently, south-north movements Ȃ do not perceive such mobility as a 
first preference. Notably, Favell himself elsewhere acknowledges the potential for such groups to 
experience tough working conditions, noting that, ǲǮ ǯ are in danger of becoming a 
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new Victorian servant class for a West European aristocracy of creative-class professionals and 
university-educated working ǳ (Favell, 2008b:711). Indeed, such fears are a stark reality in 
many unregulated sectors of the generally highly liberalised UK labour market, with migrant 
workers including EU citizens particularly vulnerable (Maroukis, 2015). With respect to south-
north movers in the context of the economic crisis, the name of the Spanish emigrant youth 
movement Ǯ nos vamos nos ǯ (we ǯ leave, they threw us out) captures something of the 
feelings of at least some in this category.v  Second, the receiving state and particularly Ǯǯ 
workers in certain sectors may experience migration not as making a positive contribution, but, as 
competition for welfare state provision and wage repression (though, as discussed below, 
aggregated evidence may differ from the local reality or perception of such experiences). Third and 
finally, sending states may feel that a Ǯ ǯ effect outweighs the economic benefits accruing 
from remittances (Nedeljkovic, 2014).  
 
Like the CPE literature he critiques, Favell seems to accept Ȃ in his 2014 piece at least Ȃ the choice 
presented by the ǯ dilemma. But in contrast to ǯ emphasis on the Ǯ ǯ, Favell 
champions Ǯ ǯǤ Favell privileges, even fetishizes, the human subject as mobile, because this 
is the human capable of delivering a pluralist cosmopolitan reality. This vision sees emancipation in 
the sociological reality of the unbundling of territory and demos.  
 
Beyond the ǯ dilemma 
 
A large empirical literature on the ǯ dilemma suggests that it may be contingent on a 
variety of factors (see Kymlicka, 2015). Cutting through its complexity, perceived pace of change in a 
given society seems particularly important. In turn, these perceptions depend on the relationship 
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between more concrete material factors and what we might call intersubjective factors. The former 
refers to such factors as numbers of immigrants, speed of immigration, the nature of the welfare 
system (for instance, contributory or not (Ruhs, 2015)) and the financial costs of immigration 
(calculable in a variety of ways). The latter refers to the cultural and psychological capacity for 
mutual trust or sympathy to emerge between migrants and receiving societies, such that the former 
come to be regarded as part of the latter. The relationship between these factors is itself politically 
contingent. Some societies will be willing and able to absorb greater numbers of migrants and 
accept larger costs. Others will be more sensitive to change. Some (individuals and societies) will be 
willing to extend the scope of solidarity and deservingness to migrants and some will not; some will 
place conditions on that deservingness by adopting a concept of solidarity based on a 
contractual/contributory economic arrangement; some will emphasise a cultural affinity; and some 
will adopt a concept based on need. Moreover, perceptions and policies change depending on the 
individual or group to whom such solidarity is extended (for evidence on the political contingency 
of 'deservingness' see, van Oorschot, 2006). In short, identifying the circumstances in which the 
dilemma is in any sense real and those in which it is not is far from straightforward.  
 
It is generally true, however, that less dramatic spikes in the numbers of incomers will delimit the 
reality of the ǯ dilemma both materially and intersubjectively. As political theorist 
Joseph Carens notes in his defence of the right to free movement (2013), the number of movers will 
be lower where individuals have the possibility to prosper and pursue their version of the good life 
without moving. This is likely to require relatively low levels of inter and intra state inequality and 
poverty and widespread political freedoms. Carens is operating in the idiom of ideal theory with 
respect to the global situation pertaining to migration. As ǯ (2013) empirical work shows, the 
feasibility of sustaining both open borders and substantive social settlements that are open to 
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migrants is low in prevailing conditions of global inequality, widespread poverty, political turmoil 
and hostility towards migration in receiving states. Open borders would likely precipitate 
movements that would impose an unsustainable pace of change on receiving states in current 
conditions and this is why more open states tend to delimit access to rights for migrants. To move 
beyond the dilemma would require radical cosmopolitan solutions geared towards global social 
justice; the kinds of solutions that many on the contemporary Left Ȃ including the Ǯǯ CPE 
literature Ȃ regard as dangerously utopian. In short, the ethics may be more difficult in relation to, 
for instance, ǯ refugee and broader Ǯ ǯ (Vaughan-Williams, 2015) or the politics 
of migration more generally (Parker and Brassett, 2005).  
 
However, ǯ ideal may be more plausible in the EU context and for intra-EU mobility. Here a 
right to movement and his Ǯ of ǯ may not be in conflict. Only 1-3% of EU 
citizens reside in an EU state other than that of their nationality. Inequalities between EU member 
states are have grown with recent enlargements and the economic crisis, but are small relative to 
the global situation and this probably largely explains the small numbers of movers. Moreover, 
cultural commonalities and the discursive framing of intra-EU migration in terms of Ǯ ǯ 
may foster mutual intersubjective adaptability (Bruzelius et al., 2014). From this perspective intra-
EU mobility does not result in rapid societal change Ȃ it does not substantially impact on nation-
states as peoples in terms of labour markets or welfare settlements. The exceptionalism of the EU Ȃ 
in terms of combining openness to (intra-EU) migrants and access to rights on a non-
discriminatory basis  (Ruhs, 2015) Ȃ is not necessarily unsustainable.  
 
Nevertheless, the issue of free movement in the EU clearly has been politicized in recent years, 
particularly since the 2004 enlargement and particularly (though certainly not exclusively) in the 
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UK. Moreover, this migration has appeared to change material realities. The numbers of EU 
nationals coming to the UK certainly did increase rapidly after 2004 Ȃ a nearly 120% increase 
between 2004 and 2013, the biggest change across all EU-15 member states (Ruhs, 2015: 11-12) Ȃ 
driven by a combination of the New Labour ǯ opening of domestic labour markets to 
new member state nationals, the relative flexibility of those markets and the decision of other large 
states (particularly Germany) not open in the same way. Migrant access to benefits has proved 
particularly controversial in the UK, where many social security and in-work benefits Ȃ such as tax 
credits that supplement low incomes Ȃ are non-contributory. In short, migrants can access certain 
benefits without necessarily Ǯ ǯ to the system. In local contexts which received large and 
rapid inward flows of migrants, large majorities voted Ǯǯ in June 2016 (Clarke and Whittaker, 
2016), citing, for instance, local pressure on public services. And finally, some studies have reported 
that EU migration has repressed some wages in low-skilled, low-pay occupations, which coheres 
with widespread public assumptions and concerns about the effects of migration on labour markets 
(Nickell and Saleheen, 2015; Dustmann et al., 2013). 
 
These ostensibly material realities are clearly important, but should not be overstated. Against 
them, there is significant macro-level evidence that EU nationals in the UK are overall net 
contributors in fiscal terms and so not a net Ǯǯ on public services (Dustmann and Frattini, 
2014). There is also no reliable evidence of widespread Ǯnefit ǯ by EU nationals in the UK 
and they claim fewer benefits than UK nationals (European Commission, 2013; Portes, May 2016). 
While potential access to non-contributory benefits creates the possibility for EU nationals to be 
portrayed as benefit tourists Ȃ drawing from rather than contributing to the national economy (in a 
way that would arguably be more difficult in more contributory systems (Ruhs, 2015)) Ȃ such 
portrayals are largely based on anecdote, not evidence. Moreover, although certain low-skill, low-
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pay occupations and sectors may have experienced wage repression and labour market 
competition, the causal importance of migration in this context has been estimated as, at most, 
extremely minimal (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015) and there is no evidence of either phenomenon 
when considering EU migration as a whole (Migration Advisory Committee, 2014, Wadsworth et al., 
2016: 7-9). These econometric studies challenge misconceptions pertaining to the (negative) 
effects of migration on labour markets that are rooted in the Ǯ of labour ǯ Ȃ the notion 
that there is a fixed amount of work within an economy. They emphasise that migration increases 
the demand for labour Ȃ through the generation of new economic activity and jobs Ȃ as well as the 
supply, so wages will not necessarily fall as a consequence of migration as is often assumed and 
may even rise. Studies also highlight that decisively determining the causal effects of migration on 
labour markets (as distinct from numerous other factors) is methodologically extremely difficult 
(Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2015: 5).vi Finally, it is notable that Ireland experienced materially very 
similar circumstances to the UK Ȃ it opened labour markets in 2004, received large inflows and has 
a largely non-contributory benefits system Ȃ but there has been far less negative politicisation with 
respect to EU migrants (Ruhs, 2015: 29).  
 
Even in a context where there has been increasing migration, the exceptionalism of the EU need not 
be unsustainable; the progressivǯ dilemma need not be real. The politicization of the issue in the 
UK has been based largely on intersubjective understandings that do not correspond with the 
material realities precipitated by free movement. It is notable in this respect that the total 
percentage of EU migrants in the UK is hugely over-estimated by the British (on average the 
perception is 15% versus 5% in reality (Ipsos MORI 2016)). This is unsurprising in a context of 
widespread anti-EU and anti-migrant media rhetoric and feeling. Unlike media in other member 
states, the pro-EU language of Ǯ ǯ is rarely deployed in the UK (Bruzelius, et al., 2014) 
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with the pejorative EU Ǯǯ often preferred. And certain strands of the tabloid press have 
consistently demonized newcomers from post-2004 enlargement member states. This negative 
message on free movement has been endorsed by growing ranks of mainstream politicians across 
the spectrum, including by successive governments. Notably, following the 2016 referendum, an 
advisor to David Cameron acknowledged that, ǲ failed to find any evidence of communities under 
pressure ǥ There was no hard evidence ǥ [I]t was clear that immigration is at best just one of 
several factors that are putting pressure on public services, along with globalization, 
deindustrialization, automation and aging ǳ (Korski, 24 October 20016). And yet 
Cameron made the issue central to his efforts to renegotiate ǯ EU membership prior to the 
referendum Ȃ securing the possibility of a so-called Ǯmergency ǯ (European Council, February 
2016)vii Ȃ and it remained central during the campaign itself. A number of ostensibly progressive 
and otherwise pro-EU commentators (Goodhart, 2013) and politicians (Mason, 4 August 2014) had 
long before 2016 lent their support to the highly debatable notion that free movement had become 
a legitimate issue of concern.  
 
The question for progressives in general is whether, in this context, it is acceptable to capitulate to 
the terms of the ǯ dilemma and, in so doing, contribute to their further (intersubjective) 
constitution. For progressive politicians, when the dilemma is understood to be real by the 
electorate, it is certainly tempting to treat it as real and respond in its terms. From this perspective, 
the electoral dilemma for the Labour party is: do they appeal to an archetypical New Labour pro-
EU, pro-migration (neo-)liberal cosmopolitan or to an Old Labour anti-EU, anti-migration pro-social 
nationalist? As noted in introduction, since the Brexit referendum there is a growing inclination in 
the party to opt for the latter; crudely, the social and national over the cosmopolitan and human. 
But any conviction politician interested in the evidence and concerned with both the Ǯǯ and 
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the Ǯǯ must surely reject the choice, particularly when the evidence compellingly supports 
such a rejection. In this context a pro-social cosmopolitan position is not an oxymoron.  
 
Certainly scholars Ȃ in the CPE tradition or elsewhere Ȃ should resist the logic of this dilemma when 
it is at best rooted in limited evidence. Indeed, when we appreciate the complex interweaving of 
material realities and intersubjective understandings, then a progressive CPE should be extremely 
cautious about an apparent correlation between migration and socially deleterious outcomes and 
not to assume that the former has in any sense caused the latter. To accept this causal logic is to 
endorse an ontology of the migrant as Ǯ ǯ to the detriment of the real-world migrant as 
human tout court. It is to embrace the diagnosis that neoliberal markets are driven by the mobility 
of such Ǯǯ (see for instance Friedman (1978: 3)) and the ǯ concomitant claim that free 
movement is an indivisible part of the internal market and its four freedoms. It is to endorse the 
view of some UK employers of migrants primarily as functionally important to the sustenance of 
labour market flexibility (Rolfe and Hudson-Sharp, 2016). In short, when a pro-social CPE accepts 
the ǯ dilemma, it endorses a reductive and dehumanising neoliberal ontology of the 
migrant, even as it diametrically opposes neoliberal prescriptions. The upshot is that it establishes 
migration (and migrants) as an inexorable problem. 
 
A more human(e) progressive ontology would reject the causal logic described above. It would 
understand mobility not as cause, but (in large part at least) as consequence or effect of broadly 
neoliberal market realities. From this perspective, the focus of critique (and reform) for CPE ought 
not be those who are mobile, but the neoliberal labour markets and other structures Ȃ including the 
other three freedoms Ȃ that have to a large extent driven (or even necessitated) their (and other 
human) mobility. This shift in discourse enables a progressive to distinguish between the ǯ first 
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three freedoms or mobilities and the fourth; to treat mobile persons as qualitatively distinct Ȃ 
indeed, divisible Ȃ from mobile goods, capital and services in terms of their effects. From this 
perspective, it is entirely consistent to support a right to EU free movement and non-discrimination 
on the one hand ȋǮ ǯȌ and advocate some kind of increased controls of the other three 
freedoms and enhanced labour market protections and regulations on the other ȋǮ social). In line 
with Carens, the more pro-social outcomes associated with such moves would likely limit actual 
mobility through constraining an important driver. In Sweden, this outcome seems to have been 
achieved in relation to EU free movement, which (along with the UK and Ireland) opened its labour 
markets in 2004. Inward migration from the new member states was far less substantial than in the 
other two countries after 2004, largely as a consequence of its much more protected and regulated 
labour markets (Ruhs, 2015: 18).  
 
Regarding migration as primarily a consequence of, rather than cause of, neoliberalism would lend 
itself to an ethic of unconditional solidarity based on need. In the current context, this means a 
concern with the reality of the destitution of many non-national EU citizens (and, indeed, other 
migrants) in the UK and elsewhere, in addition to a soldiaristic ethic based on reciprocity or 
contract (as it pertains either to EU citizens as co-workers/contributors or to citizens as co-
nationals). Concretely, this perspective allows the political Left and CPE scholarship to critique 
(rather than support) moves by member states Ȃ in a context of increasing legal uncertainty at the 
European level (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014) Ȃ to increase discrimination within the free 
movement regime. These are moves which in the UK context have delimited the category of EU 
non-national resident eligible for non-discrimination to an ever stricter conception of Ǯǯǡ 
with disproportionately adverse impacts on groups of EU citizens with more limited or patchy 
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formal labour market participation, such as women (especially those engaged in reproductive 
labour) (O'Brien, 2013:1668, 2015) or Roma (Parker and López Catalán, 2014).  
 
This human(e) ontology would also regard migrants Ȃ and indeed non-migrants Ȃ not only in terms 
of their economic subjectivity, but also in terms of other identities, including their subjectivity as 
potential citizens (Parker, 2012; Parker, 2013). In other words, it would recognize that migrants are 
motivated to move by an array of factors Ȃ not simply economic Ȃ and, when settled in their new 
home, they are potentially much more than (human) capital. Indeed, as well as rejecting the crude 
notion that migrants are agents of a neoliberal order, we should also embrace the possibility that 
they can be allies in the critique and reform of neoliberalism. Contra the ǯ dilemma, the 
mobility of people might be regarded not as an inexorable threat to, but as potentially enhancing, 
existing communities of fate. To be clear, this argument does not suggest that important tensions 
between mobility and discrete social settlements do not also have the potential to arise within the 
EU citizenship regime, or that discrimination and exclusion will never be justified or required in 
order uphold valuable and valued communal programmes or policies.viii  Rather it is to argue that 
such trade-offs ought not be regarded as generalizable or inexorable, but as contingent on shifting 
material realities and, in particular, on the intersubjective understandings that emerge in relation 
to those realities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Refusing the inexorability of the ǯ dilemma allows us to reject a stark choice between 
the Ǯǯ and the ǮǯǤ We do not have to choose between a cosmopolitan neoliberalism and 
flexible labour markets as a condition of possibility for the emancipation of EU migrant labour and 
 23 
a communitarian closure to migrants as a condition of possibility for social labour markets and 
welfare. Within the context of free movement of persons in the EU the exceptionalism of open 
borders and non-discriminatory access to substantive rights is currently sustainable. Even in the 
UK case where the issue has been most controversial and politicised, the evidence suggests a net 
economic positive impact of EU migration. In such circumstances it is neither inconceivable nor 
utopian that principled progressive political actors would seek to persuade the electorate of the 
broader positive impact of such migrants and of the benefits of the regime that facilitates their 
movement (and, indeed, all EU ǯ potential movement).  
  
That said, it is important to acknowledge that such exceptionalism is not necessarily politically 
sustainable in the longer term; it could become materially (as well as intersubjectively) 
unsustainable in a context where both inequalities and movements of people grow very rapidly. 
CPE scholarship has skillfully elucidated the structural factors in a contemporary Ǯǯ global and 
European capitalism that are precipitating and are likely to further precipitate social inequalities 
within member states, exacerbate economic imbalances and inequalities between them (for 
instance, Streeck, 2014a) and prompt at least some human mobility. As noted in the first section of 
the paper, these literatures have identified what has been called an emergent executive or 
Hayekian federalism (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012) Ȃ particularly in the context of EMU and its crises Ȃ and at once emphasized the absence of the thick transnational solidarities required to build an 
alternative (social)-democratic federalism. This analysis explains the rejection of cosmopolitan 
thinking of the sort associated with Habermas (2001) and, to the extent that they engage in 
prescription, a reassertion by many pragmatic CPE analysts of a greater level of nation-state 
autonomy (Scharpf, 2015), a possible reversion to national currencies (Streeck, 2014a) and Ȃ to the 
extent that the issue is engaged Ȃ some constraints on the free movement of people. However, the 
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first of these prescriptions need not require the last. In other words, broadly republican 
preferences need not imply a rejection of the status quo on free movement when we accept the 
divisibility of the four freedoms and refuse the inexorable logic of the ǯ dilemma. 
Moreover, to the extent that the first prescriptions are able to stall or ameliorate growing 
inequalities within and between states and guarantee secure employment Ȃ thereby delimiting 
mobility Ȃ they may even be supportive of a politically sustainable right to mobility. Such a position 
allows us to, ǲ our distance both from market-besotted neoliberals and from those who seek to Ǯ ǯ (replete with hierarchy and exclusion) from the ǳ (Fraser 2013: 5). In a 
period characterized by both rampant marketisation and an exclusionary (and often ethno) 
nationalism, the importance of the political Left situating as such could hardly be greater. 
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